This paper provides an early analysis of child care subsidies under welfare reform. Previous studies of child care subsidies use data from the pre-welfare-reform period, and their results may not apply to the very different post-reform environment. We use data from the 1997 National Survey of America's Families to analyze the determinants of receipt of a child care subsidy and the effects of subsidy receipt on employment, school attendance, job search, and welfare participation. We analyze the impact on subsidy receipt of household characteristics such as family size and structure, and past participation in welfare. Ordinary least squares estimates show positive and significant effects of subsidy receipt on employment and school enrollment. Two stage least squares estimates that treat subsidy receipt as endogenous and use county dummies as identifying instruments show much less evidence that subsidy receipt affects these outcomes.
Introduction
The 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) consolidated four different child care subsidy programs for low-income families into a single block grant, the Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF). The Act also substantially increased funding for child care subsidies, and gave states considerable flexibility in setting subsidy program rules. Furthermore, states were given permission to transfer up to 30 percent of their Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant funds into the CCDF, and to spend additional TANF funds directly on child care subsidies. These changes indicate that policy makers view child care subsidies as an important part of welfare reform. In fiscal year 1999 states spent all of their CCDF allocation of around $5 billion, and spent directly on child care or transferred another $4 billion dollars from the TANF block. However, we know very little about whether child care subsidies have in fact contributed significantly to the goals of welfare reform.
This paper provides an early analysis of child care subsidies under welfare reform. The goal of the paper is to use household survey data from the early post-reform period to analyze the determinants of subsidy receipt and the effects of subsidy receipt on employment, welfare participation, and related outcomes. The analysis uses data on a sample of single mothers from the National Survey of America's Families (NSAF), conducted by the Urban Institute in 1997. This is the only available national household survey from the post-welfare-reform period that includes information about child care subsidies. Other recent post-welfare-reform studies of child care subsidies have relied exclusively on administrative data. An advantage of household survey data over administrative data is that information is available on both subsidy recipients and non-recipients. Determinants of receipt can therefore be analyzed, and the employment outcomes of recipients and non-recipients can be compared. The survey also includes more detailed information on outcomes of interest than is usually available in administrative data. The NSAF sample includes a large number of current and former welfare recipients and other singlemother families, providing a basis for reliable inference for the target population of welfare reform. State of residence is identified in the NSAF, so we are able merge information on the characteristics and rules of state welfare and child care subsidy programs with the household data. For 13 of the largest states, county of residence is identified as well. This provides a source of within-state variation that can help identify the impact of child care subsidies.
We use the data to address two issues. First, how do household characteristics affect the likelihood of receiving a subsidy? Key household characteristics include family size and structure, and past participation in welfare. Second, how does subsidy receipt affect employment, school enrollment, job search, and welfare participation? In this part of the analysis we attempt to account for the likely possibility that unobserved determinants of receiving a subsidy are correlated with unobserved determinants of the outcomes of interest. The results indicate that past enrollment in cash assistance welfare programs and past receipt of a child care subsidy both have large positive effects on the likelihood of receiving a child care subsidy.
Conditional on these two lagged dependent variables, and on household characteristics and state fixed effects, receiving a child care subsidy at the time of the survey is associated with an eleven percentage point higher rate of employment, a seven percentage point higher probability of enrollment in school, and no differences in unemployment or welfare receipt. However, twostage least squares estimates using county dummies as instruments for subsidy receipt show smaller effects and larger standard errors, raising some doubt about whether the observed associations represent causal effects. The results of the analysis will be useful to policy makers and researchers in understanding the potential contribution of child care subsidies to achieving 1 We do not consider early education subsidies such as Head Start and Title I-A that are designed to improve child outcomes. Such programs may provide work incentives, but because they do not require employment the incentives are clearly different from those of programs explicitly designed to encourage labor force participation. See Blau (2000) for a discussion of the work incentives of early education programs. 2 The child care disregard allowed states to disregard child care expenses of up to $175 per month per child aged two or over ($200 for children under 2) from earned income in determining AFDC benefits (Committee on Ways and Means, 1998, p. 683) . The Title XX Social Services Block Grant (TXX) subsidizes a wide variety of social services and gives states flexibility in how the funds are allocated across the various eligible services. On average, about 15 percent of TXX funds (roughly $300 million) have been spent on child care in recent years (Committee on Ways and Means, 1998, p. 720) . 3 welfare reform goals.
Section 2 of the paper describes the current structure of child care subsidy programs in the U.S., and section 3 reviews previous evidence on the effects of child care subsidies. Section 4 presents descriptive information from the NSAF, and section 5 describes the models we estimate. The results of the empirical analysis of subsidy receipt and effects are presented in section 6, and section 7 concludes.
Child Care Subsidy Programs
The programs discussed here provide subsidies for work-related child care expenses of children in low-income families. Federal CCDF funds are provided to the states in three "streams:" discretionary, mandatory, and matching. Discretionary and mandatory funds are distributed according to rules similar to those of the old programs, primarily based on the number of children and state income. These two streams do not require state matching funds. To receive funds from the matching stream, "a state must maintain its expenditure of state funds for child care programs at specified previous levels ('maintenance-of-effort' spending) and spend additional state funds above those levels." (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1998, p. 5). Parents must be employed, in training, or in school, although some exceptions are permitted. In general, priority for CCDF funds is supposed to be given to families with very low incomes and children with special needs. Specifically, states must use at least 70 percent of their mandatory and matching funds 3 to serve families on welfare, families in work activities who are moving off welfare, and families at risk of going on welfare. These correspond to the three groups previously served by the AFDC-CC, TCC, and ARCC programs, respectively. The CCDF also requires that a portion of the funds be used to assist working poor families who are not currently, recently, or likely future welfare recipients -the group previously served mainly by the CCDBG program. As part of the general increase in flexibility provided by PRWORA, states are permitted to transfer up to 30 percent of their Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant funds to the CCDF to be used for child care, and can also use TANF funds directly for child care services without transferring the funds to CCDF.
States have substantial flexibility in designing their CCDF programs, including the income eligibility limit, co-payments by families, and reimbursement rates to providers. Only nine states set income eligibility at the maximum allowed by law, 85 percent of state median income. Seven states set the income eligibility limit at less than 50 percent of median income.
States are permitted to waive fees (co-payments) for families with income below the poverty line, and there is substantial variation across states in use of this provision. Fees are determined in many different ways, including flat rates, percent of cost, percent of income, and combinations of these. States are required to have sliding scale fee structures, with fees that rise with family income. Federal guidelines for implementation of the CCDF law require that the subsidy rate be set at the 75 th percentile of the price distribution from a recent local market rate survey. Recent evidence suggests that in practice many states use out-of-date market rate surveys or set the subsidy rate lower than the 75 th percentile of the price distribution (Adams, Schulman, and Ebb, 1998, p. 23 ).
The CCDF is a capped entitlement, with no obligation to serve all eligible families. It is estimated that the CCDF served only 12-15 percent of eligible children in recent years (Administration for Children and Families, 1999, 2000) . There is no systematic information available on how CCDF funds are allocated among eligible families. Schumacher and Greenberg (1999) summarize evidence from a number of studies of child care subsidy receipt by families who have left welfare in recent years. They report that in most states fewer than 30 percent of welfare leavers who are employed receive a child care subsidy. Lack of awareness of subsidies was reported to be high among these families. The studies also reported that the majority of these families were using informal child care by relatives. Jacobson (2000) also reports low subsidy use by welfare leavers in California.
Previous Evidence
Existing evidence on the determinants of receiving a child care subsidy and on the effects of child care subsidies is limited almost entirely to the pre-1996 period, before the major federal welfare reform. Concerning the determinants of subsidy receipt, Meyers and Heintze (1999) examined the use of child care subsidies in a sample of welfare recipients in four California counties in 1995. In their sample, 16 percent of employed mothers received a child care subsidy, 30 percent of mothers enrolled in education or training programs received a subsidy, and 34 percent of mothers in neither activity received a subsidy (including Head Start). The public subsidy system for child care in California was quite complex prior to PRWORA, with at least seven different subsidy programs. When mothers were asked why they did not receive subsidies from the programs for which they appeared to be eligible, the majority response for all three employment-related subsidy programs, one out of two education-and-training-related subsidies, and one out of two child-education subsidies was that they were not aware of the program. The majority response for the other two subsidy programs was "aware of the program but did not 4 Demonstrations and experiments that included child care subsidies were New Hope (Bos et al., 1999) , the Teenage Parent Demonstration (Kisker et al., 1998) , New Chance (Quint, Bos, and Polit, 1997) , GAIN in California (Riccio et al., 1994) , the National Evaluation of Welfare-toWork Strategies, formerly known as the JOBS program (Hamilton et al., 1997; Hamilton, Freedman, and McGroder, 2000) , the Minnesota Family Investment Program (Miller et al., 1997) , the Florida Family Transition Program (Bloom et al., 1999) , and the Gary, Seattle, and Denver Income Maintenance Experiments (Robins and Speigelman, 1978) . See Crosby, Gennetian, and Huston (2001) for a comparison of the treatment effects of these demonstrations.
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apply." The acceptance rate for mothers who applied averaged 72% across all programs. Fuller et al. (1999) estimated a model of the child care subsidy take-up decision of mothers enrolled in TANF using data collected in San Francisco, San Jose, and Tampa in 1998.
Of the women in their sample who used any non-maternal child care, 37-44 percent received a subsidy, depending on the site. Presumably, all of the women in this sample were categorically eligible for a child care subsidy, but there is no way to determine whether the mothers not receiving a subsidy were rationed out or did not take up the subsidy offer. A regression analysis
showed that a woman's knowledge of child care subsidy rules and participation in a TANFsponsored job search class were positively associated with receiving a subsidy.
Concerning the effects of receiving a child care subsidy, several demonstration programs designed to help low-income families achieve economic independence included child care subsidies along with other benefits and services. These programs were conducted as part of welfare waiver evaluations prior to PRWORA, and used randomized assignment methods.
However, in each case the child care subsidy was only one of several services provided as part of the program, so it is not possible to determine how much of the program impacts were due to the child care subsidy.
4
Three studies have estimated the impact of actual child care subsidies on employment. Berger and Black (1992) negative effect on the probability of receiving public assistance in 1979.
The drastic nature of the 1996 welfare reform may make the pre-reform results of these three studies less relevant for predicting responses to current and future subsidies. Less emphasis was placed on moving welfare participants into employment before PRWORA. A mother might have been able to turn down a child care subsidy offer before PRWORA and remain out of the labor force without losing her welfare benefit. A mother who turned down a child care subsidy today would be more likely to lose eligibility for welfare. It seems plausible that a mother who is going to lose her welfare eligibility in any case would be likely to accept a subsidy offer and join the labor force. So the results of studies conducted in the pre-PRWORA environment will not necessarily be a good guide to behavior in the post-PRWORA era.
A final source of evidence on the impact of child care subsidies comes from studies of the effect of the price of child care. More than a dozen studies have estimated the effect of the price of purchased child care on the employment behavior of mothers. One of the motivations for this literature is to infer how child care price subsidies would affect employment decisions.
Whether inferences about the effects of subsidies drawn from this literature are useful depends on several factors. First, if there are substantial costs to taking up a subsidy, either in the form of time costs required to negotiate the subsidy bureaucracy or psychic costs ("stigma") of participating in a means-tested program, then price effects on employment may not be a reliable guide to subsidy effects. Second, the price effects estimated in this literature are generally assumed to be linear, while most subsidies are nonlinear. Nonlinearity of a subsidy does not affect the qualitative result that a child care price subsidy increases the incentive to be employed, but it could affect the magnitude of the employment effect. Third, issues of specification and estimation of econometric models of price effects could affect the inferences drawn from such effects. Estimated price elasticities reported by the authors of the studies range from .06 to -1.26.
Blau (2000) reviews these studies and concludes that differences in specification and estimation play an important role in producing variation in the estimates. See Anderson and Levine (2000) , Blau and Hagy (1998) , Kimmel (1998), and Tekin (2001) for recent examples of such studies.
Data
The National Survey of America's Families (NSAF) was conducted by the Urban
Institute between February and November 1997. 5 It was designed to analyze the consequences of devolution of responsibility for social programs from the federal government to the states. The survey was conducted by telephone on a sample derived primarily from random-digit dialing.
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Residents of 13 states 7 were over-sampled in order to allow detailed within-state analysis, and low-income households (income less than twice the federal poverty level) were over-sampled as well. The full NSAF sample includes 44,461 households. We select a subsample from the 13 over-sampled states consisting of households headed by an unmarried mother with at least one child under age 13. We focus on single mothers because they are the main target group for welfare reform. The great majority of families receiving cash transfers from public assistance programs are headed by a single mother (over 90 percent of TANF cases with an adult recipient in 1998; Committee on Ways and Means, 2000, p. 437) . We use the 13 over-sampled states because county of residence is identified for these states. After excluding cases with missing data, we have a sample of 3,653 households.
The main variables of interest are child care subsidies, employment status, and welfare status. The mother is asked whether she receives any assistance paying for child care, including assistance from a welfare or social services agency, her employer, and a non-custodial parent.
We code a family as receiving a child care subsidy if the mother reports that a welfare or social service agency pays for all or part of the cost of child care for any of the children in the family. Table 1 shows that 10.5 percent of our sample receives a subsidy by this measure. The
Administration for Children and Families (1999, 2000) estimates that 12-15 percent of eligible families received a CCDF subsidy in 1998-99. We cannot determine eligibility in our sample, and undoubtedly some of the families in our sample are ineligible as a result of income in excess of the eligibility threshold 8 . So a ten percent subsidy coverage rate is not implausible.
Employment is measured by whether the mother is employed as of the survey date, and welfare receipt is measured by whether the family receives cash assistance from AFDC or its successor program TANF as of the survey date. The employment rate is 67.9 percent and the welfare participation rate is 21.9 percent. The NSAF also records whether the family received welfare in the year prior to the survey date, and whether the family received a child care subsidy during the first three months after leaving welfare since January 1995, if the family was previously on welfare. In some specifications of our models we condition on these lagged dependent variables in order to control for unobserved heterogeneity that might be correlated with employment and subsidy receipt. 29 percent of the sample received welfare at some time during the 12 months prior to the survey, and four percent received a child care subsidy in the first three months after leaving welfare since January 1995.
We expect that subsidy recipients would have a higher employment rate than nonrecipients, since most child care subsidies are conditioned on employment or employmentrelated activities such as education, training, and job search. Table 1 shows that the employment rate is 70.3 percent among subsidy recipients and 67.6 percent among non-recipients. This is a surprisingly small difference, and suggests that a substantial proportion of subsidy recipients may be in school, training, or unemployed. To explore this issue, we tabulated the reason for not working offered by mothers in our sample who received a child care subsidy and were not employed. Forty three percent reported attending school as the reason for not being employed, and another 19 percent reported being unable to find work, actively seeking work, or recently separated from a job. We refer to the latter group as "unemployed" for brevity. The remaining 38 percent reported "taking care of family," and other reasons that seem inconsistent with receiving a child care subsidy that has an employment or employment-related activity requirement. 9 It is not clear why these women are receiving a child care subsidy. One possibility is that their children are in Head Start or some other subsidized preschool program that does not have an employment requirement. The NSAF reports the type of child care used during the month prior to the survey, and includes Head Start as an option. However, only 14 percent of the mothers who receive a subsidy and are not employed, in school, or unemployed report using Head Start.
In order to examine the effects of child care subsidies on employment-related activities, we analyze a binary indicator for being enrolled in school (conditional on not being employed) and a binary indicator for being unemployed . As shown in Table 1 , 4.9 percent of the sample are enrolled in school, and 6.1 percent are unemployed. Table 1 shows that child care subsidy recipients are much more likely to be on welfare than non-recipients, 35.2% versus 20.4%. This is consistent with the stipulation of the CCDF that priority for subsidies should be given to families on welfare, families in work activities who are moving off welfare, and families at risk of going on welfare. The lower panel of Table 1 shows that child care subsidy receipt is almost twice as common for families on welfare (16.9%) compared to families not on welfare (8.7%). However, the employment rate of mothers on welfare is only about 26 percent compared to 80 percent for mothers not on welfare.
In the analysis that follows we condition on a small set of characteristics of the mother and her family, including her age, race, ethnicity, health status, education, presence of children by age, family structure, and nonwage income. Descriptive statistics for these variables are given in Table 2 . In some specifications we include state dummies and various county characteristics as well.
Model
Our goal is to model receipt of a child care subsidy, and the effect of subsidy receipt on outcomes such as employment and cash assistance. The econometric model consists of the following pair of equations:
where S i is a binary indicator of subsidy receipt, O i is a binary outcome such as an indicator of whether the mother is employed, X i is a vector of family characteristics, the Z's are vectors of policy variables and other characteristics of the community of residence of the family, , i and 0 i are disturbances, and $, the ('s, ", and * are parameters. We specify linear equations for ease of estimation and interpretation. The Appendix provides a behavioral model as a basis for the specification of these equations. Equation (1) is a reduced form model of the receipt of a child care subsidy. The demand for child care subsidies by families is determined by the price of child care, nonwage income, the mother's wage rate, preferences for consumption relative to leisure, stigma associated with participating in a means-tested subsidy program, the psychic and time costs of establishing and maintaining eligibility for the subsidy, and so forth. These are determined in turn by observed family characteristics (X), observed features of the state and local child care subsidy system and the state and local economy (Z c ), and unobserved family and state-local characteristics (,). However, child care subsidies are rationed because the program is funded at a level too low to serve all eligible families. Thus not all families who demand a child care subsidy receive one. Subsidies are rationed on the basis of observed family characteristics (X), observed features of the state and local child care subsidy system and economy (Z c ), and unobserved family and state-local characteristics (,). Thus (1) is a reduced form -we cannot distinguish the demand effects (a family's decision to apply for a subsidy) and supply effects (the subsidy provider's decision to award a subsidy) of X and Z c , just the net effects on subsidy receipt.
Equation (2) is a model of the effect of receiving a child care subsidy on an outcome of
interest. The outcomes we analyze below include employment, school enrollment, unemployment, and welfare participation. As noted in the recent literature on treatment effects 10 We do not have information on the amount of the subsidy, although in principle we could estimate it using the program rules and the relevant family characteristics. A structural model would contain the price of child care, the mother's wage rate, and nonwage income. We have substituted the determinants of these variables, so (2) is really a quasi-reduced-form model. This approach allows us to avoid the difficult problems of estimating wages and prices of nonworkers and non-payers, respectively. See Tekin (2001) for an analysis that deals with these issues.
15 (Heckman, 1997 (Heckman, , 1999 Angrist and Imbens, 1999) , in a model such as (2) " does not have a well-defined economic interpretation. That is, " does not represent a ceteris paribus price effect, income effect, or some well-defined combination of them. Despite the absence of a sound economic interpretation of " , we follow the treatment effect literature (e.g. Angrist and Krueger, 1999 ) by estimating equation (2) and interpreting " as the "causal effect" of receiving a subsidy on the outcome of interest. We do this for two reasons: we do not have the data needed to estimate the parameters of a behavioral model 10 , and this is the approach followed by previous studies of child care subsidies. If all families that receive a subsidy get the same dollar amount of assistance, and if all families have the same response to receiving a subsidy, then " can be interpreted as the ceteris paribus effect of being assigned a subsidy and accepting it. This parameter is of interest, but is not a fundamental parameter of a behavioral model. In the Appendix we show that " depends on both preference parameters and the parameters of the mechanism used by administrators to assign subsidies.
The literature on child care subsidies discussed above emphasizes that , i and 0 i are likely to be correlated. A mother who is strongly motivated to work may also be motivated to seek a child care subsidy, imparting a positive correlation. Alternatively, the least employable mothers may be singled out for subsidies by administrators of the subsidy system, imparting a negative correlation. Our approach to identification is based on exclusion restrictions. One might think 11 The covariates include state policy variables such as the CCDF reimbursement rate, incomeeligibility level, child care subsidy expenditure per capita, and other state-level variables such as the unemployment rate, median income, and the child poverty rate. Also, when we included these variables in the subsidy receipt equation (1), they had effects on subsidy receipt that were jointly and individually insignificantly different from zero. In contrast, state dummies have effects in (1) that are jointly significantly different from zero. We attribute the lack of effects of the policy variables together with strong effects of state dummies to the fact that all states ration subsidies, and rationing is the main determinant of subsidy receipt. Rationing mechanisms appear to differ across states in ways that are not captured by program rules and policies.
16 that the rules of the state child care subsidy system would affect whether a family receives a subsidy, but conditional on receiving a subsidy would not affect the employment decision. In this case such variables would be included in Z ci but could be excluded from Z oi . However, we
show in the Appendix that in general this is not true. Rules that determine eligibility affect how much a mother can earn and therefore the value of being employed and receiving a subsidy.
Rules that determine the subsidy amount affect the value of being employed and receiving a The model we present in the Appendix suggests that the only valid identifying instruments in this model are factors that determine how subsidies are rationed. To identify ", we assume that these factors are determined at the county level, and we treat county dummies as identifying instruments. We control for state fixed effects in the employment and other outcome models, and therefore rely on within-state variation in subsidy receipt by county to identify the effects of subsidies. It is plausible that the degree of rationing and subsidy receipt vary across 12 Lemke et al. (2000) analyze the work behavior of child care voucher recipients in Massachusetts, using variation in local child care policy and other local variables to explain employment outcomes.
13 These variables were collected from the City-County Data Book and County Business Patterns, and include population size; the age, race, ethnic, education, and sex structure of the population; median income; percent in poverty; land area, population density; employment and employment growth; local government employment; payroll; and the number of establishments. The county dummies are identifying instruments, so it is not possible to test the validity of excluding them from the second stage. In OLS estimates of the second stage equations, the hypothesis that the county dummies can be excluded is rejected, but this does not imply anything about their validity as identifying instruments.
counties within states because local program administrators generally have considerable flexibility in allocating subsidies (Carroll, 2001 ). Layzer and Collins (2000) report substantial variation across counties in the structure of the child care subsidy administration (see also Blank et al., 2001, and Mitchell et al., 1997) . 12 We show below that county dummies have good explanatory power in first stage estimates of equation (1).
However, the validity of our estimates hinges on the assumption that there are no unobserved county-level determinants of employment within states, i.e., that county dummies can be excluded from equation (2). If this assumption is incorrect then our Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) estimates will be biased. For example, if local administrators who are relatively successful in getting child care subsidies to their clients are also good at getting clients into jobs, then county dummies should not be excluded from the employment equation. Or if the tightness of the county labor market is for any reason correlated with county child care subsidy rationing policy, then our identification strategy is invalid. In order to guard against this possible threat to the validity of our 2SLS estimates, we include in equation (2) 21 county-level variables that measure demographic and labor market characteristics of counties.
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This model is similar to those estimated in previous analyses of the effects of child care subsidies, although the source of identification is different in each case. Gelbach's (1999) model is identified by quarter-of-birth of five year old children, which affects enrollment in kindergarten, but (by assumption) not employment. Meyers, Heintze, and Wolf (2000) identify the effect of a child care subsidy by excluding from the employment equation an indicator of how well the mother knows the rules of the child care subsidy system. Berger and Black (1992) use several comparison groups to sweep out various fixed effects. Their approach achieves identification through covariance restrictions: the disturbances are assumed to consist of a common fixed effect and independent idiosyncratic components. Sweeping out the fixed effects by assumption removes the source of the correlation between the errors of the subsidy and employment equations. Table 3 presents estimates of equation (1), the model for receipt of a child care subsidy.
Results
The first column presents estimates without lagged dependent variables. The likelihood of subsidy receipt decreases with the mother's age until age 43. Blacks are more likely to receive a subsidy than whites and other races (other race is the reference group), and Hispanics are slightly less likely to receive a subsidy than non-Hispanics, other things equal. Mothers who have completed high school are about three percentage points more likely to receive a subsidy than high school dropouts (the reference group). Mothers with a child aged 0-5 but no child 6-12 are 3.5 percentage points less likely to receive a subsidy than mothers with children in both age groups (the reference category), and mothers with a child 6-12 and no child 0-5 are 9 percentage points less likely to receive a subsidy than mothers with children in both age groups. Higher nonwage income reduces the likelihood of receiving a subsidy, but the effect is quite small. The specification reported in Table 3 percent attend school or are unemployed at the same time as receiving welfare, so 11.4 percent of the sample is in a work-related activity at the same time as being on welfare. The fact that receiving a child care subsidy is associated both with increased work-related activities and increased welfare participation probably results from the fact that current and former welfare recipients are intended to receive priority for a subsidy, and the subsidy has a work requirement.
The second row presents results from OLS estimates of a specification that includes state dummies. Adding the state fixed effects reduces the welfare impact slightly and has virtually no effect on the estimates for the other outcomes. The third row is the same as the first row except that it adds lagged dependent variables (to both the first and second stage models): welfare receipt in 1996 and child care subsidy receipt following exit from welfare. This increases the effect of child care subsidy receipt on employment from .05 to .11, slightly reduces the effect on school attendance, and slightly increases the unemployment effect. Conditioning on these lagged variables may control for unobserved heterogeneity. The substantial increase in the effect of child care subsidy receipt on employment suggests that the unobserved variables are negatively correlated with receipt of a subsidy. Adding the lagged dependent variables causes the effect of child care subsidy receipt on welfare participation to fall to zero. Conditional on past welfare receipt, receiving a child care subsidy does not affect the likelihood of current welfare receipt.
This suggests that child care subsidy receipt does not cause increased welfare receipt. Rather, child care subsidy receipt is more likely when a family has been on welfare in the past, and past welfare receipt is strongly associated with current welfare receipt. The fourth row is just like the second except for adding the lagged dependent variables, and the estimates are very similar to 14 We estimated models in which Head Start cases were reclassified as not receiving a subsidy. This had negligible effects on the child care subsidy coefficient estimate. 15 There are 285 counties included in the 13-state sample used here, and there is considerable variation in the child care subsidy receipt rate across counties within each of the 13 states. The coefficient of variation of the county-level receipt rate ranges from .59 to 1.99 and averages 1.27 across the 13 states. The (unweighted) average number of sample members per county is 14.7, which is relatively small and accounts for the increase in the standard errors in the 2SLS estimates. A Hausman test for the equality of the OLS and 2SLS estimates fails to reject equality in almost every case in Table 4 . 21 those in row 3. 14 As noted above, we refrain from giving a causal interpretation to the effects of the lagged variables, since we do not have the information needed to determine whether their effects are causal or simply control for unobserved heterogeneity.
The lower panel of Table 4 presents 2SLS estimates of the same four specifications as in the upper panel, using county dummies as identifying instruments. The standard errors in the 2SLS estimates are two to three times larger than in the OLS models, so inferences are less precise. 15 The estimated impact of child care subsidy receipt on employment in the 2SLS
estimates ranges from -.074 to +.061 but the coefficient estimate is always less than its standard error. In the cases with positive 2SLS estimates, the point estimates are smaller than the corresponding OLS estimates, suggesting that the OLS estimates are biased upward. We cannot reject the hypothesis of no impact of child care subsidies on employment, but the results are somewhat inconclusive due to the increase in the standard errors. The estimated impact on employment of .046 in row 8 is similar to Gelbach's estimate of .05, and is much smaller than the estimates of Berger and Black (.08 to .25) and Meyers, Heintze, and Wolf (.52 for an increase in the probability of subsidy receipt from 0.0 to 0.5). Gelbach's census sample is similar to our NSAF sample because both are from population surveys, while the samples used in the other two studies are derived from administrative records.
The 2SLS results for school attendance are positive and not much different from the OLS estimates, and in the specifications without the lagged dependent variables we reject the hypothesis of no impact. Hence the finding of a positive impact of child care subsidy receipt on school attendance seems fairly robust. The effects on unemployment are generally small and never significantly different from zero, similar to the OLS estimates. Finally, the 2SLS estimates of the effect of child care subsidy receipt on welfare participation are positive, much larger than the corresponding OLS estimates, and three of the four estimates are significantly different from zero. However, controlling for both state fixed effects and lagged welfare participation yields an estimate (.055) that is the smallest of the four and is smaller than its standard error. The 2SLS results for welfare are thus similar to the OLS estimates in showing that the strong positive association between welfare and child care subsidy receipt is probably due to unobserved heterogeneity rather than a causal effect. Our results are quite different from those of Gelbach, who found a subsidy effect of -.04 on receipt of public assistance.
The estimates in Table 4 do not control for the 21 county-level variables described in the previous section. Adding these variables to the models shown in Table 4 resulted in very small changes in the estimated impact of child care subsidies. None of the inferences drawn from the results in Table 4 are changed at all by including these variables. And specification tests indicated that conditional on including the state dummies, the hypothesis that the county-level variables can be excluded from the outcome equations was never rejected for any model for either the OLS or 2SLS estimates. Hence as far as we can tell, the results are not biased by omission of county characteristics.
In view of the fact that child care subsidy receipt is associated with both increased employment (and school attendance) and increased welfare participation, it is of interest to examine the welfare-employment connection in more depth. In this classification scheme, work takes precedence over other work-related activities; if a mother is employed then she is classified in category 1 or 2 regardless of whether she also attends school. Only if she is not employed do we then classify her by whether she is in a workrelated activity (3 or 4) or not (5 or 6). This scheme allows us to determine whether the effect of receiving a child care subsidy on employment and work-related activities varies by welfare status. The regressors in the model are the same as those in the appendix table, corresponding to the row 1 specification in Table 4 . The estimated coefficients on the child care subsidy variable and associated simulation results are shown in Table 5 . The first set of estimates uses the actual child care subsidy indicator, while the second uses the predicted value from the first stage model from Table 3 . The latter corresponds to the 2SLS approach, although the standard errors are not corrected for the first stage estimation. Four of the five subsidy coefficient estimates are significantly different from zero in the specification using the actual subsidy variable. Child care subsidies are associated with increased employment conditional on receiving welfare (row 1), but have a small negative effect on employment conditional on not receiving welfare (row 2).
Similarly, child care subsidies have a positive effect on work-related activities conditional on receiving welfare (row 3) but no effect on such activities when not on welfare (row 4). The results using the predicted child care subsidy are similar in sign and much larger in magnitude.
These findings suggest that child care subsidies succeed in increasing employment and employment-related activities of welfare recipients but have little impact on employment of nonrecipients. The CCDF is intended to give priority for subsidies to current and former welfare recipients, and the evidence presented here indicates that this strategy does help members of this group.
Conclusions
Child care subsidies are an important part of welfare reform, and funding for such subsidies has grown rapidly in the last few years. Yet there is little information available about whether child care subsidies have in fact contributed significantly to the goals of welfare reform.
This paper presents evidence on child care subsidies received by single mothers with a child under age 13 from data collected in 1997, the first year of welfare reform. Child care subsidies were received by about 10 percent of the sample. Subsidy recipients were about 3 percentage points more likely to be employed than non-recipients, and about 5 percentage points more likely to be employed after controlling for a small set of family characteristics. Subsidy recipients were also about eight percentage points more likely to be enrolled in school, no more likely to be unemployed, and about 15 percentage points more likely to be on welfare than non-recipients.
The school enrollment and unemployment differences are not affected by controlling for family characteristics, while the welfare participation difference falls to 10 percentage points. These figures along with the multinomial logit analysis suggest that child care subsidies encourage employment and school enrollment among welfare recipients, but not among non-recipients.
The child care subsidy program created as part of the welfare reform of 1996 (the CCDF)
is intended to facilitate participation in employment and employment-related activities such as education and training. Thus it is not surprising that a mother is more likely to be employed or in school if she receives a child care subsidy. However, the guidelines for implementing the CCDF state explicitly that current and former welfare recipients and families at risk of reliance on welfare should have priority for child care subsidies. This may explain why subsidy recipients are more likely to be on welfare than non-recipients. Welfare participants are much less likely to be employed than are non-participants, but the increase in employment associated with receiving a child care subsidy among welfare recipients is larger than among non-recipients.
There are several potentially promising avenues for further research on the determinants and consequences of child care subsidy receipt. The most pressing need is for survey data with information on whether families without a subsidy were ineligible, eligible but not offered a subsidy, or eligible and offered a subsidy but did not take it up. This would make it possible to do a more convincing analysis of the causal impact of subsidy receipt. A second useful approach would be to combine survey data with administrative records from the subsidy program, as in Berger and Black (1992) . This would provide the possibility of constructing comparison groups, such as families on waiting lists for a subsidy. Finally, an experiment in which eligible families are randomly assigned to receive a child care subsidy may offer the best opportunity to determine the impact of child care subsidies on employment and welfare participation. 17 We do not empirically analyze the choice of paid versus unpaid care or the employment decision of the relative, but these choices are included in the theory to account for the use of unpaid child care.
Appendix
We develop a simple static model of behavior as a basis for specifying an empirical model. Assume that a young child requires continuous care by an adult. The mother provides child care during her leisure hours. During her work and work-related hours she can receive free child care from a relative or purchase child care in the market, but she cannot care for the child while working, attending school, or engaging in other work-related activities. The relative divides her time between child care and leisure, with employment ruled out. For simplicity, assume that all non-maternal child care is either unpaid or purchased, but not a combination of the two. We focus on work, work-related activities, and welfare choices in the empirical analysis. 17 A child care subsidy can be received if the mother is employed or if she is not employed but is in a work-related activity such as education or job search. There may be direct disutility from receiving welfare or a child care subsidy, as a result of stigma. A subsidy can be received only if income is below the subsidy eligibility limit and the family is offered a subsidy.
Welfare can be received only if income is below the welfare eligibility limit, but for simplicity we assume there is no rationing of welfare assistance (i.e., no time limits or sanctions). We assume that a mother can either work or be in some other work-related activity, but she cannot do both. She can receive welfare while working or in a work-related activity, or while doing neither. We model work-related activities as providing utility, which is an ad hoc way of capturing the value to the mother of future wage increases caused by education, training, and job search. The utility function, time constraints, budget constraint, and non-negativity constraints 18 This constraint captures the assumptions that a mother can use either informal or formal child care but not both, and that she can be employed or in a work-related activity, but not both. = the rate at which child care benefits are reduced as earnings increase r = the subsidy rate per hour of child care if income is zero E s = the income eligibility limit for a child care subsidy B = the welfare benefit if not employed E W = the income eligibility limit for welfare t W = the rate at which welfare benefits are reduced as earnings increase R = a binary indicator =1 if an eligible family is offered a subsidy, =0 otherwise.
The family chooses R M , h, a, R r , I, H, c, W, and s to maximize utility subject to the constraints. There are four scenarios to consider.
1. The family is ineligible for welfare regardless of hours worked (Y>E W ), and is either ineligible for a child care subsidy regardless of hours worked (Y>E s ) or is eligible but rationed out (Y#E s , R=0). In this case s=W=0 because subsidy and welfare receipt are not part of the choice set. The family then chooses from among the first five discrete alternatives listed in Appendix Table A1 .
2. The family is ineligible for welfare (Y>E W ), potentially eligible for a subsidy, and a subsidy is offered (Y#E s , R=1). In this scenario the family makes a choice from the first seven alternatives listed in the table. Alternatives (1)- (5) are the same as in the first scenario. In alternatives (1), (2), and (4) no paid child care is used, so no subsidy is received. In alternatives (3) and (5) the family pays for child care and is therefore eligible for a subsidy, but chooses not to take up the subsidy. In alternatives (6) and (7) the subsidy is accepted and hours of work are low enough so that income does not exceed the eligibility limit.
3. The family is eligible for welfare (Y<E W ), and potentially eligible for a subsidy, but a subsidy is not offered (Y#E s , R=0). In this scenario the family faces alternatives 1-5 and 8-12.
Alternatives 8-12 are the same as 1-5 except for welfare receipt. In alternatives 8-12, hours of work are low enough so that income does not exceed the welfare eligibility threshold. 
Models for work-related activity, welfare, and combinations of the outcomes have the same form as (A2). E s appears in the employment model because in alternatives 6-7 and 13-14 a subsidy can be received only if earnings plus other income is less than the eligibility limit. And r and t s appear because the value of the subsidy influences the relative attractiveness of employment.
This demonstrates the assertion in the text that subsidy program rules cannot be excluded from the employment outcome equation.
In principle, there are two possible estimation strategies for this model. One is to estimate the multinomial discrete choice model as specified above. Unfortunately, this is not feasible because we do not observe R, the rationing indicator. R determines the choice set (i.e., which of the four scenarios described above is relevant). Without this information, we would be forced to assume that R=1 for everyone, resulting in people who have been rationed out of a subsidy being incorrectly assumed to have the option of taking up a subsidy.
The other alternative is to estimate the system of equations (A1)-(A2) by Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS). Notice that the employment probability conditional on subsidy status does not depend on R, so R is in principle a valid identifying instrument. We do not observe R, but we assume that R can be proxied by county dummies. For this strategy to produce consistent estimates, R must not correlated with any variables in (A2) except for s. Note: County dummies are also included in the model. The F-statistic for a test of the hypothesis that the effects of the county dummies are jointly zero is 1.41, which rejects at better than 1 percent. Standard errors corrected for arbitrary forms of heteroscedasticity are in parentheses.
* indicates that the coefficient estimate is significantly different from zero at the five percent level. Notes: The complete results for the models in row 1 are given in the Appendix Table. Identifying instruments in the 2SLS models are county dummies. Standard errors corrected for arbitrary forms of heteroscedasticity are in parentheses.
a. The lagged dependent variables are welfare participation in 1996, and receipt of a child care subsidy after leaving welfare since January 1995.
* indicates that the coefficient estimate is significantly different from zero at the five percent level. Notes: The other regressors in the model are those shown in appendix Table A2 . The simulations were computed by setting the child care subsidy variable to zero for all observations, computing the predicted probabilities, and averaging over the sample. This was repeated with the subsidy variable set to one for all observations. The figures reported are the change in the probabilities as the subsidy variable changes from zero to one.
* indicates that the coefficient estimate is significantly different from zero at the five percent level. Notes: Sample size is 3,653. The estimates correspond to those in row 1 of Table 4 .
